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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 2006 and 2007 the state of Oregon conducted a groundbreaking mileage fee pilot 
program. The program responded to a national concern that fuel taxes will stop serving 
as a reliable revenue source as a large proportion of the vehicle fleet transitions to 
running on little or no petroleum-based fuel. To prepare Oregon for this future threat to its 
transportation revenues, the state legislature authorized a pilot program to test mileage 
fees as a replacement for the state fuel tax.
THE STUDY DESIGN
This study examines the interactions between urban form and drivers’ responses to the 
Oregon mileage fee program, using data from 130 households participating in the program. 
The analysis compares the program’s impact on vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in different 
locations and at different times for households charged with two different fee structures: 
• Peak-Charged households, who paid a fee of 10 cents per mile during peak hours 
in the region’s congested zone but a fee of only 0.43 cents per mile for all other 
mileage within Oregon.
• Flat-Rate households, who paid a flat fee of 1.2 cents per mile for all mileage within 
Oregon.
THE STUDY FINDINGS
The analysis focused on testing four hypotheses. These, along with the key results, are 
as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Peak-Charged households will reduce their VMT during high-cost times 
more than will Flat-Rate households.
Peak-Charged households did, as expected, reduce their driving during high-cost 
times more than did the Flat-Rate households. Charging a noticeably higher fee for 
driving in congested conditions successfully achieved the goal of inducing households 
to reduce their VMT in those times and places where congestion is most a problem.
Hypothesis 2: Peak-Charged households will increase travel in the off-peak time period, 
and/or at all times outside the peak-charge zone, as compensation for reducing their travel 
during the peak hour within the peak-charge zone.
Contrary to this hypothesis, there were no detected spillover effects to off-peak weekday 
hours or to areas in Oregon outside the peak-charge zone. The results about spillover 
effects to weekends and to areas outside the state of Oregon were inconclusive. The 
lack of evident spillover may result from conditions specific to the Portland region, 
including the urban growth boundary (UGB) in Portland, which limits the presence of 
travel destinations outside the urban area.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
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Hypothesis 3: Given a sufficient incentive to reduce driving, households in denser, mixed-
use, and transit-accessible neighborhoods are more likely to reduce their VMT than would 
households in other types of neighborhoods.
The findings confirm this hypothesis for Peak-Charged households. Density and a 
mix of land uses were statistically significantly correlated with reduced VMT of several 
types, suggesting that when the travel cost increases in peak hours, households in 
denser and mixed-use neighborhoods are able to reduce their VMT more than those 
who do not live in these neighborhoods.
The models also suggest that the urban form effects on Flat-Rate households are quite 
different from the effects on Peak-Charged households. For a Flat-Rate household, 
density and mixed-use tended to encourage, not discourage, driving. A possible 
explanation for this surprising finding is presented in the main text of the report.
Hypothesis 4: Replacing the gas tax with a mileage fee reinforces the influence of urban 
form on households’ travel patterns, perhaps because such a fee establishes a stronger 
and more prominent connection between travel cost and travel distance than does a gas 
tax.
The study results mostly confirm this hypothesis. The introduction of the peak charge 
enhanced the influence of urban form on several types of household VMT. Also, for all 
types of VMT the urban form variables had a greater influence on the Peak-Charged 
households than on the Flat-Rate households.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The study results suggest various implications for transportation policymakers, including 
the following five:
1.  Charging a noticeably higher fee for driving in congested conditions can successfully 
motivate households to reduce their VMT in those times and places where congestion 
is most a problem.
2.  Households in all types of neighborhoods studied will likely reduce their peak-hour 
and overall travel under a mileage fee program that charges a high-rate for peak-
hour travel, though households in higher-density neighborhoods with a mix of land 
uses will likely make greater reductions in VMT.
3.  A mileage fee program that charges a high rate during the peak hour will likely 
strengthen the underlying influence of urban form on travel behavior, as compared 
to the current gas tax system. In other words, urban form patterns will affect travel 
behavior more than they currently do if the nation shifts to a new system of mileage 
charges that vary by congestion levels. For planners, this finding suggests that 
switching from fuel taxes to mileage taxes would strengthen the power of land-
use planning as a policy tool to shift some travel from solo driving trips to more 
sustainable modes. Also, this finding about the link between urban form and travel 
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behavior in response to a mileage fee implies that mileage-fee program designers 
will need to carefully consider both current and future urban form patterns when 
estimating the likely revenues collected from mileage fees and also the impact the 
fees could have on congestion levels.
4.  The study findings suggest that residents in lower-density suburban areas, as well 
as residents in higher-density and more mixed-use neighborhoods, are able to 
reduce their driving in response to a mileage fee. Therefore, the results add new 
empirical evidence to the ongoing equity debate about whether mileage fees are 
unfair to households living in suburban communities, and suggest that this concern 
may not be warranted.
5.  Although a peak-hour mileage charge could encourage drivers to think carefully 
about their travel decisions and they would probably reduce their VMT accordingly, 
the ultimate program outcomes will likely depend on the specific program design, 
especially when and how the mileage fee is paid. If the payment is made less 
frequently than the current system of gas taxes charged at the pump, such as 
through a monthly billing program, drivers might increase instead of decrease their 
VMT because they would be less aware of the cost of their travel.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
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INTRODUCTION
In 2006 and 2007 the state of Oregon conducted a groundbreaking mileage fee pilot 
program. The program responded to a national concern that fuel taxes will stop serving as 
a reliable revenue source as a large proportion of the vehicle fleet transitions to running on 
little or no petroleum-based fuel. To prepare Oregon for this future threat to its transportation 
revenues, the state legislature authorized a pilot program to test mileage fees that could 
potentially replace the state fuel tax. The pilot tested both a flat-rate fee that was the same 
for any mile driven, and also a variable fee structure that charged drivers a higher fee for 
miles driven during the rush hour.1
Since the pilot ended, researchers have examined many facets of the program’s success, 
including the performance of the technology and ways that drivers changed their travel 
behavior once they were paying the flat-rate and variable mileage fees rather than the 
gas tax. One crucial aspect of the behavioral response that has not yet been well studied, 
however, is whether people’s behavioral responses to the mileage fees are correlated with 
any elements of the urban form around their homes. The term urban form is defined broadly 
to include land use patterns, such as density and mixed use, urban form measures, such as 
location in a metropolitan region and street connectivity, and accessibility to public transit. 
This study addresses that research gap by exploring three specific research questions: 
• Does urban form correlate with any of the travel behavior changes that participants 
made in response to the Oregon mileage fee pilot program?
• Which urban form factors are most significant in explaining travel behavior variations?
• Do the effects of urban form differ under the two fee structures tested: the flat-rate 
fee and the variable fee with a higher rate during the peak periods?
THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
Both federal and state policymakers are currently studying mileage fees as a serious 
option for replacing or supplementing fuel taxes, and a growing number of transportation 
finance experts believe that mileage fees are the future of transportation financing and 
congestion pricing.2 Internationally, mileage fee programs have already been established 
for trucks in Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and Germany, and the Netherlands 
was, until recently, planning to implement the first ever nationwide mileage fee system 
for all vehicle types. Within the United States, numerous other states, including Hawaii, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Colorado, Florida, Rhode Island, Minnesota, and Texas, have also 
expressed an interest in phasing out fuel taxes in favor of charging motorists for how much 
they drive.
Given this intense interest in mileage fees, and the likelihood that a number of such 
programs will be tested and perhaps established in the upcoming decade, the need for 
a better understanding of behavioral responses is important. This study’s results join the 
small but rapidly expanding body of empirical studies that seek to understand the benefits, 
potentials, and concerns of a mileage fee program. In particular, the study complements 
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the existing research by using empirical analysis to explore a question previously almost 
untested: the link between urban form and behavioral responses to mileage fees.
Investigating whether urban form influences behavioral responses to the mileage fees has 
various important research and policy implications. Most important, urban form patterns 
might prove the key to better explaining the observed behavioral responses to the mileage 
fee program. We hypothesized that urban form, which has been mostly overlooked by prior 
studies, could significantly affect a household’s response to a mileage fee program and 
should be taken into account in program design and evaluation.
Understanding the relationship between mileage fees and urban form will help researchers 
and policymakers more accurately predict outcomes, including the effect of a mileage 
fee on VMT and revenue in different locations. Such analysis can also inform the equity 
discussions that arise whenever mileage fee programs are proposed. A common concern 
is that switching from fuel taxes to a mileage fee program will penalize residents in low-
density communities, since they have fewer transit options and nearby destinations than 
residents of more urban communities and thus might have a more difficult time reducing 
VMT. Looking at the Oregon data allows us to add real-world evidence to a debate that 
has, so far, largely been conducted without any particular empirical evidence.
EXISTING RESEARCH ON MILEAGE FEE PROGRAMS
Despite worldwide interest in mileage fees as a possible replacement for fuel taxes, very 
little research has been done to understand how applying a mileage fee to all travel might 
influence travel behavior. In the United States, there have been just a handful of pilot mileage 
fee programs that provided usable data for analysis. Along with the Oregon project that 
is the focus of this report, the Minnesota Department of Transportation and Puget Sound 
Regional Council (PSRC) tested experimental mileage-fee programs in 2006 and 2007, 
and the Netherlands ran a road pricing experiment for six months in the city of Eindhoven. 
(The University of Iowa is also currently conducting a national field test and evaluation of 
a mileage fee program.) Given the scarcity of data on how users have responded to real-
world mileage fee programs, a few researchers have also developed models using survey 
data or travel diary data to predict how people might respond to mileage fees charged on 
all their travel.3
Previous empirical studies confirmed a great variation in behavioral responses in both 
Oregon4 and Minnesota,5 but they have failed to explain most of the variation. For 
example, only 6% of the VMT changes in the Oregon pilot were explained by household 
characteristics, access to transit, and personal attitudes. We hypothesize that urban 
form such as density, land use diversity, and proximity to different types of transportation 
facilities, which have been overlooked in most previous research, could significantly affect 
a household’s response to a mileage fee program and should be taken into account in 
future program design and evaluation.
To date, research has looked at only two different connections between urban form and 
behavioral responses to mileage fee programs. First, Rufolo and Kimpel analyzed the 
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Oregon pilot program data and found that close proximity to a transit stop was correlated 
with greater reductions in VMT with the mileage fee.6
A second connection that has been explored involves differences between urban and 
rural areas. This connection responds to equity concerns, raised because rural residents 
usually have to travel farther for work and personal needs and have fewer transit and 
nonmotorized transportation options than residents in more urban communities.7 One 
group of authors has written two papers using modeling of 2001 NHTS data to estimate 
the cost to drivers of a mileage tax versus a fuel tax that would both raise the same total 
revenues for Oregon.8 The authors conclude that a shift to a VMT fee yields the opposite 
result for rural residents from what conventional wisdom suggests. With a revenue-neutral 
VMT fee, a rural household on average would pay less than under a traditional gas tax, 
mostly because of the lower average fuel efficiency in most rural vehicles, as compared to 
the urban fleet.
OVERVIEW OF THE REPORT
The remaining sections of this report cover three main topics:
The section titled “Study Methodology” describes the operational details of the 2006-2007 
Oregon Road User Fee Pilot that are relevant to the data analysis presented here, and 
discusses the methodology and data used for the analysis.
The section titled “Analysis and Findings” presents the analysis conducted for this study. 
The chapter begins by presenting a series of four hypotheses and the analyses completed 
to test each one. The discussion ends with additional modeling work conducted to explore 
some puzzling results.
Finally, the section titled “Conclusion” summarizes the key findings from the data analysis 
and suggests some policy implications, as well offering suggestions for future research 
into the interaction between mileage fee programs and urban form.
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STUDY METHODOLOGY
THE OREGON MILEAGE FEE PILOT PROGRAM
In 2006 and 2007 the state of Oregon conducted a groundbreaking mileage fee pilot 
program in response to a concern that fuel taxes would eventually cease to provide 
sufficient transportation revenues as an increasing percentage of the vehicle fleet began to 
run on little or no petroleum-based fuel. This section of the report discusses the design of 
the Oregon program, the socioeconomic characteristics of the participants, and the survey 
and vehicle-miles-traveled (VMT) data collected.
The Program Design
Oregon’s Mileage Fee Pilot Program tested two types of experimental fees: a flat-rate 
VMT fee that approximated the price of the state gas tax, and a fee whose rate varied by 
the time of day and location. The latter system imposed a high peak-hour fee for driving in 
the Portland metropolitan area during specific times of the day, paired with a low fee for all 
miles driven outside the metropolitan area and/or outside the peak hours. The primary goal 
of the pilot program was to test whether the technology to track vehicle mileage and charge 
the appropriate fees to drivers would work, but the program also collected mileage and 
survey data that have made it possible to investigate how the program affected household 
driving behavior.
Oregon DOT recruited participants in the spring of 2006 through press releases, an 
informational website, and radio and print advertising. Volunteers were initially screened 
by telephone and then asked to attend an evening sign-up meeting.9 In the end, 168 
households with 207 vehicles were enlisted to participate in the program, which ran for a 
ten-month period from 2006-2007.10
All vehicles in participating households were outfitted with Global Positioning System 
(GPS) devices designed to record the participants’ driving behavior. The participants also 
agreed to purchase gasoline at two specific service stations at regular intervals, and the 
mileage data was transferred from the vehicles to the program managers each time gas 
was purchased from these two stations. A third requirement for participants was that they 
complete a survey on three separate occasions: before the program (June 2006), midway 
through the program (October-November 2006), and at the end of the program (March-
April 2007). The surveys gathered information on household characteristics and travel 
decisions made during the program.
Most of the participating households were located in the eastern portion of the metropolitan 
region, likely because that’s where the two gasoline stations participating in the study were 
located (Figure 1). Large portions of the suburbs east of downtown Portland were developed 
prior to World War II, resulting in neighborhoods today that have a greater mix of land 
uses, a finer-grained grid street network, and higher densities with better transit service. 
However, neighborhoods farther from downtown, including those close to the participating 
gas stations, do not exhibit many of these traditional urban form characteristics. As a result, 
there is significant variation among the participating households with respect to urban form 
characteristics that might influence travel behavior.
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Figure 1. Residential Locations of the 130 Study Participants Used in the MTI Analysis
Source: Map prepared by Melissa Reese using data from the Oregon Department of Transportation and Metro’s 
Regional Land Information System (RLIS).
The program was broken into two phases. In Phase 1, a 4.5-month control phase, the 
households paid the regular state gas tax, so there was no program-based incentive for 
them to change their regular driving behavior. The VMT was recorded for all the participating 
vehicles to establish  baseline driving behavior for that vehicle. In Phase 2, which lasted for 
5.5 months, participants were broken into three groups, each of which paid a different type 
of tax or fee on gasoline purchases: 
Control group: Members of the small Control group (approximately 10% of the participating 
households) continued to pay the regular state gas tax, though the data from their miles 
driven was recorded when they fueled up at the participating gas stations.
Flat-Rate group: Members of the Flat-Rate group did not pay the state gas tax, but were 
instead charged a VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile for all miles driven within Oregon. This 
rate was chosen to approximate the 24-cent-per-gallon state gas tax. In other words, the 
rate was set so that participants would pay about the same amount in VMT fees that they 
would otherwise pay in state gasoline taxes. Participants did not pay the mileage fee for 
travel outside of Oregon, nor did they receive refunds on taxes paid on gas purchased 
outside of the state.
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Peak-Charged group: Members of the Peak-Charged group paid a higher VMT fee of 
10 cents per mile for all driving inside the Portland urban growth boundary (UGB) during 
the peak periods (7 to 9 AM and 4 to 6 PM, Monday through Friday, excluding holidays).11 
For other travel within Oregon during the peak hour, as well as for travel within the UGB 
at off-peak times, they paid only 0.43 cents per mile. As with the Flat-Rate group, these 
households did not pay a mileage fee for travel outside of Oregon, nor did they receive 
refunds on taxes paid on gas purchased outside of the state.
Households were not randomly assigned among the three groups. Instead, the program 
managers assigned participants to a group using a designated set of rules. First, if the 
household owned one or more ineligible vehicles (i.e., diesel vehicles or cars bought 
before 1996), then it was assigned to the Control group. Households that failed to regularly 
purchase their gas at one of the two designated service stations during Phase 1 were also 
placed in the Control group. The remaining vehicles were divided between the Flat-Rate 
and Peak-Charged groups according to how many miles they drove within the UGB during 
peak hours. For households that regularly traveled in the UGB during peak hours, three 
were placed into the Peak-Charged group for every one placed in the Flat-Rate group.12 
As a result, only one-third of the Flat-Rate households typically traveled within the UGB 
during peak hours, while the number of Peak-Charged group participants who didn’t use 
the congestion zones in their daily travel was kept to a minimum.13
Households received special receipts each time they purchased gas at one of the two 
participating service stations (see Figure 2). These receipts showed participants the money 
they “saved” by not paying the gas tax, how much money they were charged in mileage 
fees, and how many miles they had driven in four different categories since last refueling 
at one of the participating service stations: miles charged the peak rate, other miles in 
Oregon, miles driven outside Oregon, and miles for which the GPS device did not record a 
location. The participants in the two experimental groups were also able to submit receipts 
in January and March of 2007 and receive refunds on the gas tax for gasoline purchased 
at non-participating service stations within Oregon.
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Figure 2. Sample Mileage Fee Receipts 
Source: James M. Whitty, Oregon’s Mileage Fee Concept and Road User Fee Pilot Program: Final Report (Oregon 
Department of Transportation, November 2007), p. 20.
Another piece of the charging structure in Phase 2 was that members of both experimental 
groups received so-called “endowment accounts” with which to pay their mileage fees. 
These accounts were given to the participating households at the beginning of Phase 2, 
and all mileage fees charged to them were deducted from these accounts.
Each household’s endowment account was set at a level that was estimated to be slightly 
higher than would be needed to cover the mileage fees the household would pay if it 
continued to drive in its Phase 1 patterns.14 Therefore, if a household’s driving pattern 
remained the same in both phases, its endowment account would almost balance out to 
zero at the end of the experiment. The average amount of money placed in the endowment 
accounts was $51.50 for a Flat-Rate household and $123.20 for a Peak-Charged household.
Participants were told the amount of their endowment account at the beginning of Phase 
2 of the experiment, but were not informed of how it was calculated. They received notice 
from ODOT about the balance in their account every few weeks but could not track the 
balance in real time. Households were told that if there was any balance left in their account 
at the end of the program, they could keep that money.15 This element of the program was 
designed to create an incentive for households to reduce their VMT. Finally, ODOT did not 
hold households responsible for paying the mileage fees if they ran out of money in the 
endowment account, though households were not told this.16
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THE PARTICIPANTS
A total of 183 households participated in the pilot program. For the analysis conducted in 
this report, however, that group was reduced for the reasons detailed in Table 1. After all 
these exclusions, the end result was a sample of 130 households, with 62 in the Flat-Rate 
group and 68 in the Peak-Charged group.
Table 1. Households Excluded from the Analysis in the MTI Study 
Reason for exclusion Number excluded
Valid VMT data was not captured 15
Home address could not be geocoded in GIS 17
Household was located outside the urban growth boundary 2
Household bought or sold a vehicle during the program 12
Household had at least one car not enrolled in program 19
Household had highly unusual VMT patterns: i.e., had an unusu-
ally high average daily VMT per vehicle in Phase 1 (more than 100 
miles a daya) or had a change of 40 miles or more in average daily 
VMT per vehicle from Phase 1 to Phase 2
7
Control Group households that did not pay any form of mileage fee 
in Phase 2 
8
Note: Some households were excluded for multiple reasons.
a  We suspect that such households may have done long-distance driving atypical of their daily routines, such as cross-
country travel, and therefore should be excluded from this analysis.
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Table 2. Socio-Demographic and Structural Characteristics of the Participant 
Households
Households in MTI analysis, 
by group
All house-
holds in the 
ODOT pilot 
(n=183)
All households 
in the MTI analy-
sis (n=130)
Peak-Charged 
households 
(n=68)
Flat-Rate 
households 
(n=62)
Drivers in HH
1 62% 61% 59% 63%
2 37 38 40 37
3 1 1 1 0
Vehicles in HH
1 68 70 69 71
2 29 26 29 23
3 3 4 1 6
4 1 0 0 0
Adults in HH (16+ years)
1 46 47 46 48
2 46 45 46 45
3 6 5 6 5
4 1 2 3 0
5 1 1 0 2
Child in HH (≥1) 28 28 32 24
Employment in HH
Full-time employee ≥1) 71 68 78 58
Only part-time employees 10 10 6 15
Only unemployed 16 20 15 26
Only full-time students 2 2 1 2
HH Income
 < $40K 33 37 29 45
 $40-60K 36 37 40 34
 > $60K 27 26 31 21
Note: Percentages within each category may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
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THE DATA: SURVEY DATA, TRAVEL DATA, AND URBAN FORM MEASURES
• Mileage within Portland UGB during the AM peak, PM peak, and non-peak on each 
of the five weekdays (5 x 3 = 15 types) 
• Mileage within Oregon but outside the Portland UGB in the peak and off-peak hours 
on each of the five weekdays (5 x 2 = 10 types)
• Mileage on Saturday and Sunday inside Portland UGB, plus weekend mileage 
outside Portland UGB but inside Oregon (2 x 2 = 4 types) 
• Mileage outside Oregon for all days (1 type)
• Mileage driven where the GPS signal could not be read (1 type)
After the full set of 96 variables had been defined, two processes were followed to refine 
this large set into a small number of the most appropriate variables for use in the models. 
First, for all variables looking at the same factor at different scales, simple regression 
models were estimated to select the most appropriate spatial scale. Only the scale 
that yielded the highest adjusted R2 value was included in the final model specification. 
Adjusted R2 indicates the goodness-of-fit of the model, the higher the better. Second, 
correlations among variables were tested, and when variables were correlated only the 
one that achieved the highest R2 value was retained.
Completing these two steps resulted in nine urban form measures: five measured 
accessibility, one measured density, one measured land-use mix, and the final two 
measured street pattern and cycling infrastructure. Table 3 describes how each of the 
variables was defined and the sources of data used to construct them.
In addition to testing the urban form variables, we also included in the model one program 
variable related to the pilot study design: the network distance to the two designated 
refill gas stations. This variable was included in the models to check whether the location 
of these two gas stations could have affected participants’ behavioral response to the 
program, especially for those who lived farther away from the stations. Since participants 
had to use the stations periodically during the study, living far away from the stations might 
have influenced their driving patterns.
Household-level demographic variables were created using the survey data. These 
variables included the number of drivers, the number of vehicles, the number of adults, 
the presence of children, employment status, and income. In addition, each household’s 
“Phase 1 base VMT,” or the household’s average daily VMT per vehicle during Phase 1, is 
also included in the analysis.
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Table 3. 
U
rban Form
 Variables U
sed in the Study M
odeling
C
ategory
D
efinition
D
escription/operation
D
ata source
A
ccess
N
etw
ork distance to 
frequent bus stop 
(dum
m
y variable; 
0.25-m
ile buffer)
• 0 = no stops w
ithin 0.25 m
iles, by netw
ork distance
• 1 = netw
ork distance to stop is less than 0.25 m
iles
• Frequent bus = w
ith a headw
ay less than 15 m
inutes
• (M
ethod follow
s R
ufulo and K
im
pel. a)
R
LIS
 B
us S
tops shapefile
 
N
etw
ork distance 
to light rail stop 
(dum
m
y variable; 
0.5-m
ile buffer)
• 0 = no light rail stops w
ithin 0.5 m
iles, by netw
ork distance
• 1 = netw
ork distance is less than 0.5 m
iles
R
LIS
 Light R
ail S
tops shapefile (m
i-
nus the light rail stops added in 2009 
after the study, w
hich took place from
 
O
ct. 2007 to S
ept 2008)
 
N
etw
ork distance to 
dow
ntow
n (m
iles)
•   D
efined dow
ntow
n as a single dow
ntow
n point, P
ioneer C
ourthouse S
quare. 
•   C
alculated the netw
ork distance using E
S
R
I’s netw
ork analyst closest facility operation.
G
eocoded one point for dow
ntow
n 
based on the location of P
ioneer 
C
ourthouse S
quare
 
N
etw
ork distance 
to P
ortland’s U
G
B
 
(m
iles)
•   C
reated points for all places w
here the U
G
B
 intersects a m
ajor arterial road. 
•   Found the netw
ork distance to closest point using E
S
R
I’s netw
ork analyst closest facility operation.
R
LIS
 U
G
B
 shapefile
 
N
etw
ork distance to 
closest freew
ay exit 
(m
iles)
• E
xported the freew
ay ram
ps from
 the m
ajor arterial shapefile.
• C
onverted the ram
ps that w
ere lines into points representing the point of entry on the highw
ay.
• U
sed the netw
ork analyst tool to find the m
inim
um
 netw
ork distance betw
een each household and the closest freew
ay entry ram
p. 
R
LIS
 M
ajor A
rterial S
treets shapefile
D
ensity
D
ensity of residential 
units w
ithin 0.5-m
ile 
buffer (residential 
units per acre)
• C
alculated the land area w
ithin a 0.5-m
ile buffer of each study household, then subtracted the area of all bodies of w
ater in the buffer zone.
• For all block groups w
ithin 0.5 m
ile of a study household, calculated the percentage of each block group’s land area that lies w
ithin the buffer. 
• A
llocated the corresponding percent of the block groups’ residential units to each buffer and found the sum
 of the estim
ated residential units w
ithin the 
0.5-m
ile buffer, based on the percentage of each block group in the study area.
• Found the density of residential units w
ithin each buffer based on the estim
ated num
ber of units and the calculated land area w
ithin the 0.5-m
ile buffer 
zone around each study household.
• (M
ethod follow
s Forsyth, S
ection 3.6. b)
U
.S
. C
ensus 2000
M
ixed 
use
E
ntropy Index 
(captures 7 land-use 
types) 
• The E
ntropy Index is a m
easure of land use hom
ogeneity. The form
ula is: 
Entropy {  –∑
k [(p
i )(ln p
i )]}/(ln k) 
w
here k= num
ber of land use categories and p
i  = P
roportions of each of the six land-use types.
• S
even land-use categories w
ere used: single fam
ily residential, m
ulti-fam
ily residential, com
m
ercial, vacant, public, other, and industrial. 
• The study area w
as a 0.5-m
ile buffer around each household.
• (M
ethod follow
s Forsyth, S
ection 5.9. c)
R
LIS
 tax lot shapefile
(S
cale 0 to 1: value of 0 indicates 
hom
ogeneity, w
herein all land uses 
are of one type; a value of 1 indicates 
com
plete heterogeneity, w
herein 
all land-use categories are evenly 
distributed)
Street 
connec-
tivity
4-w
ay intersection 
density w
ithin 0.5-
m
ile buffer (intersec-
tions per acre)
• C
reated intersections for all streets w
ithin a 0.5-m
ile buffer of each study household.
• S
elected only the intersections w
ithin the 0.5-m
ile buffer of each household, to elim
inate the false intersections created at the edge of the 0.5 m
ile buffer. 
• Found all intersections that represented points w
here 3 or m
ore street-line segm
ents converge (vs. cul-de-sac end points and points w
here streets bend).
• C
alculated the num
ber of intersections divided by the area of each 0.5-m
ile buffer around the study households (area excluding w
ater).
• (M
ethod follow
s Forsyth, S
ection 6.6
 d)  
R
LIS
 streets shapefile
B
ike lane length 
w
ithin 3-m
ile buffer 
(feet)
• C
alculated the total length of bike routes and m
ulti-use paths w
ithin a 3-m
ile buffer of each household.
R
LIS
 bike routes shapefile
a  
A
nthony M
. R
ufolo and Thom
as J. K
im
pel, “R
esponses to O
regon’s E
xperim
ent in R
oad P
ricing,” Transportation R
esearch R
ecord 2079 (2008): 1-7.
b  
A
nn Forsyth, ed, E
nvironm
ent and P
hysical A
ctivity: G
IS
 P
rotocols (M
inneapolis, M
N
: D
esign C
enter, 2007), Version 3.6, S
ection 6.6, http://w
w
w
.designforhealth.net/resources/gis_protocols.htm
l.
c 
A
nn Forsyth, ed, E
nvironm
ent and P
hysical A
ctivity: G
IS
 P
rotocols, (M
inneapolis, M
N
: D
esign C
enter, 2007), Version 5.9, S
ection 6.6, http://w
w
w
.designforhealth.net/resources/gis_protocols.htm
l.
d 
 A
nn Forsyth, ed, E
nvironm
ent and P
hysical A
ctivity: G
IS
 P
rotocols, (M
inneapolis, M
N
: D
esign C
enter, 2007), Version 6.6, S
ection 6.6, http://w
w
w
.designforhealth.net/resources/gis_protocols.htm
l. 
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
We tested four hypotheses to understand the effect of the pilot program on VMT changes, as 
well as the interaction between urban form and the mileage fees. The first two hypotheses 
look at how each household’s daily VMT may have varied between Phase 1 and Phase 2:
Hypothesis 1: Peak-Charged households will reduce their VMT during high-cost times 
more than will Flat-Rate households.
Hypothesis 2: Peak-Charged households will increase travel in the off-peak time period, 
and/or at all times outside the peak-charge zone, as compensation for reducing their 
travel during the peak hour within the UGB (the peak-charge zone).
The next two hypotheses assess the interaction between urban form and the mileage fee 
program:
Hypothesis 3: Given a sufficient incentive to reduce driving, households in denser, 
mixed-use, and transit-accessible neighborhoods are more likely to reduce their VMT 
than would households in other types of neighborhoods.
Hypothesis 4: Replacing the gas tax with a mileage fee reinforces the influence of 
urban form on households’ travel patterns because such a fee establishes a stronger 
and more prominent connection between travel cost and travel distance than does a 
gas tax.
After presenting the findings for each hypothesis, this chapter ends with a discussion of how 
the program design, especially the endowment accounts, may have affected participants’ 
response to the program.
EXPLORING THE VARIATION IN VMT BETWEEN PHASE 1 AND PHASE 2
To investigate the nuances of how VMT varied between the two phases of the pilot program, 
as well as between the Flat-Rate households and Peak-Charged households, we looked at 
seven different measures of VMT, consolidated from the 31 types available in the original 
data set. The unit for all seven measures is the average daily VMT per household vehicle 
in a participating household. 
1. Portland Weekday Peak: The average daily VMT per household vehicle inside the 
Portland urban growth boundary (UGB) during peak hours (7 to 9 AM and 4 to 6 PM).
2. Portland Weekday Off-Peak: The average daily VMT per household vehicle inside 
the Portland urban growth boundary (UGB) but in the off-peak hours (before 7 AM, 
between 9 AM and 4 PM, and after 6 PM).
3. Oregon Low-Fee Weekday: The sum of Portland Off-Peak VMT and the VMT 
outside the UGB but still inside Oregon.
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4. Oregon Weekday: The average daily VMT per household vehicle for all weekday 
travel within Oregon.
5. Oregon Weekend: The average daily VMT per household vehicle on weekends 
and holidays everywhere in Oregon, including within the Portland UGB.
6. Outside Oregon All Days: The average daily VMT per household vehicle outside 
Oregon on all days of the week (weekdays, weekends, and holidays).
7. Overall: The average daily VMT per household vehicle inside and outside Oregon 
on all days of the week (weekdays, weekends, and holidays).
Table 4 and Table 5 summarize the descriptive statistics of the seven types of VMT, in 
Phase 1 and Phase 2, for both Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households. Peak-Charged 
households drove more than Flat-Rate households in Phase 1, a distinction caused by the 
selection process described in the previous section. Most types of VMT decreased from 
Phase 1 to Phase 2 except the Portland Weekday Peak for Flat-Rate households, which, 
surprisingly, increased by 18%. This increase might be caused by the pilot program design, 
especially the endowment account that essentially exempted participants from paying the 
gas tax or the mileage fee. This issue will be discussed again at the end of the chapter. 
Note that the Oregon Weekend and Overall VMT decreased dramatically from Phase 1 
to Phase 2 for both household groups, with the two groups showing similar percentage 
changes. This similarity in behavior between the two groups indicates that the reduction 
might not be caused by the pilot program. We suspect that the reduction resulted from a 
seasonal change in travel patterns. It is well documented that total monthly VMT in the U.S. 
tends to be higher in the summer than in the winter.19 Also, data from nine traffic monitoring 
stations20 on the main highway intersections in the Portland metropolitan indicated that 
for the five-month period from November to March 2007 (roughly the months of Phase 
2), average monthly VMT is 7% lower than for the months from June to October in 2006 
(roughly the months of Phase 1). Later in the chapter we use the difference-in-difference 
method to control for this seasonal change.
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Table 4. Average Daily VMT per Household Vehicle for the Flat-Rate Households, 
for Different Categories of Travel, by Phase (n=62 HHs)
Average Median
Miles %
Standard 
Deviation Miles %
Minimum
(miles)
Maximum
(miles)
Portland Weekday Peak
Phase 1 (P1) 4.6 3.7 3.3 0.7 19.2
Phase 2 (P2) 5.3 4.3 3.9 0.9 18.7
Difference (P2 – P1) 0.6 18 2.2 0.3 12 -5.1 8.3
Portland Weekday Off-Peak
Phase 1 14.2 6.2 13.9 4.3 36.7
Phase 2 14.2 6.6 12.8 3.5 36.1
Difference (P2 – P1) 0.01 3 4.0 -0.2 -1 -12.1   10.9
Oregon Low-Fee Weekday
Phase 1 18.0 8.1 16.8 6.6 41.8
Phase 2 16.8 8.6 16.1 3.5 40.6
Difference (P2 – P1) -1.2 -4 5.4 -1.9 -13 -12.1 16.5
Oregon Weekday
Phase 1 22.6 9.8 20.7 8.8 52.6
Phase 2 22.2 10.8 21.2 4.4 53.6
Difference (P2 – P1) -0.5 -1.0 6.6 -2.2 -10 -11.7 21.2
Oregon Weekend
Phase 1 35.5 14.4 37.9 8.9 77.0
Phase 2 26.4 15.1 22.4 7.2 59.4
Difference (P2 – P1) -10.8 -27 10.9 -10.0 -31 -33.5 23.9
Outside Oregon All Days
Phase 1 2.8 4.1 1.3 0.0 21.8
Phase 2 1.7 4.8 0.2 0.0 36.1
Difference (P2 - P1) -1.1 -28 5.0 -0.4 -68 -21.8 24.9
Overall
Phase 1 28.1 12.3 26.8 9.0 58.7
Phase 2 24.4 12.7 22.5 7.4 80.6
Difference (P2 – P1) -3.7 -12 8.2 -3.9 -18 -27.3 23.3
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Table 5. Average Daily VMT per Household Vehicle for the Peak-Charged House-
holds, for Different Categories of Travel, by Phase (n=68)
Average Median
Miles %
Standard 
Deviation Miles %
Minimum
(miles)
Maximum
(miles)
Portland Weekday Peak
Phase 1 8.7 5.7 6.7 3.2 36.3
Phase 2 7.7 6.1 6.6 0.0 32.3
Difference (P2 - P1) -1.1 -13 3.0 -0.4 -7 -10.7 9.4
Portland Weekday Off-Peak
Phase 1 17.1 7.4 15.6 5.3 39.5
Phase 2 16.7 8.9 15.7 3.1 48.4
Difference (P2 - P1) -0.3 -2 4.7 -0.3 -2 -12.1 16.2
Oregon Low-Fee Weekday
Phase 1 21.5 9.8 21.0 5.3 53.5
Phase 2 18.9 9.2 19.9 3.1 48.9
Difference (P2 - P1) -2.6 -10 6.1 -3.3 -18 -24.5 13.1
Oregon Weekday
Phase 1 30.0 11.9 28.2 8.9 67.5
Phase 2 26.6 11.5 25.2 6.4 56.6
Difference (P2 - P1) -3.6 -11 6.8 -3.5 -12 -26.7 7.4
Oregon Weekend
Phase 1 49.2 22.8 46.9 9.2 80.1
Phase 2 33.2 16.4 31.6 1.2 74.6
Difference (P2 - P1) -16.0 -28 17.0 -13.8 -28 -77.5 8.8
Outside Oregon All Days
Phase 1 3.5 4.1 1.8 0.0 19.8
Phase 2 2.7 4.9 0.6 0.0 22.5
Difference (P2 - P1) -0.8 -56 4.7 -0.5 -57 -13.3 18.7
Overall
Phase 1 37.7 14.3 35.2 13.3 74.9
Phase 2 31.3 11.8 30.5 9.1 56.3
Difference (P2 - P1) -6.4 -15 9.0 -6.5 -18 -34.4 10.1
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THE EFFECT OF THE MILEAGE FEE ON VMT CHANGES
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1: Peak-Charged households will reduce their VMT during high-cost times 
more than will Flat-Rate households.
To test the effect of the peak charge on household VMT within the UGB during the peak 
hour, a difference-in-difference method21 was used. The basic premise of this method is to 
examine the effect of a treatment by comparing the treatment group after treatment both 
to the treatment group before treatment and to some other control group. Because many 
factors may impact the participants during the treatment period, this method uses a control 
group to eliminate the influence of the non-treatment factors, assuming that these other 
factors were the same for the treatment and control groups.
The difference-in-difference method was used to control for any potential travel changes 
between Phase 1 and Phase 2 caused by seasonal travel patterns. First, the changes 
between Phase 1 and Phase 2 VMT were calculated for both the Flat-Rate and Peak-
Charged households. Second, the VMT change for both household types was compared 
using the paired-difference method. 
This analysis found that Peak-Charged households reduced their Portland Weekday 
Peak VMT by an average of 1.46 miles more than did the Flat-Rate households (see 
the first data row in Table 6). However, we wondered if this difference between the two 
groups might be explained not by the different fee structures, but rather by the fact that 
the Peak-Charged households had a higher average VMT in Phase 1. (Households were 
not randomly assigned to the two groups, as explained in the previous chapter.) To control 
for this effect, the sixth data column of Table 6 shows the percentage changes in VMT. 
Looking at the change in miles driven as a percentage, rather than as an absolute number, 
shows that the Peak-Charged households reduced their Portland Weekday Peak driving 
by 30 percentage points more than did the Flat-Rate households.
In summary, the difference-in-difference analysis confirms Hypothesis 1. It shows that the 
Peak-Charged households did, as expected, reduce their Portland Weekday Peak driving 
more than did the Flat-Rate households. The reduction was 30 percentage points more for 
Portland Weekday Peak miles, 9 percentage points more for Oregon Weekday miles, and 
3 percentage points more for Overall miles. Charging a noticeably higher fee for driving 
in congested conditions successfully achieved the goal of inducing households to reduce 
their VMT in those times and places where congestion is most a problem.
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Table 6. Change in Average Household Daily VMT per Vehicle, from Phase 1 to 
Phase 2, Comparing Peak-Charged and Flat-Rate Households
Mean differencea in 
change in average 
daily VMT
Mean % difference 
in average daily 
VMT
Peak- 
Chargedb 
(miles)
Flat- 
Ratec 
(miles)
Peak-Charged – 
Flat-Rated 
(miles / p-value)
Peak- 
Charged 
(miles)
Flat- 
Rate 
(miles)
Peak-Charged 
– Flat-Rated 
(percentage 
points/p-value)
Portland Weekday 
Peak
-1.1 0.7 -1.46 (0.00) -13% 18% -30 (0.00)
Portland Weekday 
Off-Peak
-0.3 0.01 -0.34 (-0.61) -2% 3% -5 (0.28)
Oregon Low-Fee 
Weekday
-2.6 -1.2 -1.34 (-0.16) -10% -4% -5 (0.39)
Oregon Weekday -3.6 -0.5 -2.79 (-0.01) -11% -1% -9 (0.05)
Oregon Weekend -16.9 -10.8 -5.18 (-0.04) -28% -27% -1 (0.80)
Outside Oregon All 
Days
-0.8 -1.1 -0.28 (-0.77) 56% -28% 99 (0.30)
Overall -6.4 -3.7 -3.03 (-0.05) -15%  -12% -3 (0.46)
Notes: 
•  Bold font indicates the difference is significant at the 5% level.
•  The Peak-Charged households group has 68 observations, and the Flat-Rate households group has 62 
observations
•  See Table 4 and Table 5 for the VMT data used to create this table.
a The difference is calculated first, and then the mean is derived.
b Peak-Charged households, N=68. Difference calculated as Phase 2 – Phase 1.
c Flat-Rate households, N=62.Difference calculated as Phase 2 – Phase 1.
d This is the difference-in-difference calculated using the paired difference function in SPSS (the numbers are not the 
direct difference between the first two columns in this table).
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2: Peak-Charged households will increase travel in the off-peak time period, 
and/or at all times outside the peak-charge zone, as compensation for reducing their 
travel during the peak hour within the UGB (the peak-charge zone).
It is possible that the Peak-Charged households might compensate for reducing their 
Portland Weekday Peak travel by increasing travel at other times. For example, households 
might shift shopping trips from weekdays to weekends as a way to reduce mileage during 
the peak hours. To test Hypothesis 2, four such possible spillover effects were checked: 
increases in Portland Weekday Off-Peak, Oregon Low-Fee Weekday, Oregon Weekend, 
and Outside Oregon All Days VMT. 
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First, a check of Table 6 shows that there was no statistically significant increase in 
Portland Weekday Off-Peak VMT or Oregon Low-Fee Weekday VMT. To confirm this 
finding, we also compared (1) the expected reduction of Oregon Weekday VMT caused by 
the reduction of the Portland Weekday Peak VMT with (2) the actual reduction of Oregon 
Weekday VMT. The VMT data in Table 5 indicate that, for the Peak-Charged households, 
the average Portland Weekday Peak VMT is 29% of the Oregon Weekday VMT in Phase 1 
(8.6 miles / 30.0 miles). A 30% reduction in Portland Weekday Peak VMT equals an 8.7% 
reduction in Oregon Weekday VMT (30% x 29%), which is the exact same reduction that 
Table 6 shows for the change in Oregon Weekday VMT. It is thus reasonable to conclude 
that the drop in observed Oregon Weekday VMT is caused entirely by the reduction of 
Portland Weekday Peak VMT. Therefore, there are no spillover effects to off-peak hours 
on Portland weekdays and to areas outside the Portland UGB.  
The same process was used to check if there was spillover to the Oregon Weekend, 
and Outside Oregon All Days VMT. The Oregon Weekday VMT accounts for about 65% 
of the Overall VMT for the Peak-Charged households (Table 5). A 9% reduction would 
result in a 5.8% reduction (65% x 9%) in Overall VMT. However, the actual Overall VMT 
change is only a 3% reduction (and the change is statistically insignificant), suggesting 
that the Oregon Weekday VMT reduction may be offset by increases in other VMT types. 
For example, there is a large increase in Outside Oregon All Days VMT, though the 
change is statistically insignificant and, so, inconclusive. One possible explanation for 
the inconsistency is that Outside Oregon VMT has a large standard error in the change in 
miles (2.4 miles) and Oregon Weekend VMT has a large standard error in the percentage 
change (94%). Therefore, there might be a spillover effect for VMT on the weekends and 
outside Oregon, but our data are unable to confirm this due to the small sample size and 
a large variation in the data.
To conclude, the results do not confirm Hypothesis 2. There are no detected spillover effects 
to off-peak hours or to areas outside the peak-charge zone. There could be spillover effects 
to weekends and to areas outside the state of Oregon, but the result is not conclusive. 
The lack of evident spillover to areas outside Oregon where no mileage fee was applied, 
including just over the Columbia River to the state of Washington, makes sense given the 
economics of the region. First, most of the region’s jobs are located within the Oregon part 
of the region. Second, and perhaps more important in explaining off-peak and weekend 
travel, the State of Oregon does not have a sales tax, while the State of Washington does. 
Therefore, people living in Oregon have an economic disincentive to shop in Washington.
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN URBAN FORM AND THE MILEAGE FEE
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3: Given a sufficient incentive to reduce driving, households in dense, mixed-
use, and transit-accessible neighborhoods are more likely to reduce their VMT than would 
households in other types of neighborhoods.
In order to capture the interaction between the urban form and the mileage fee, we ran 
regression models for each of the seven types of VMT. For each model, the dependent 
variable is the change between Phase 1 and Phase 2 in average daily VMT per household 
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vehicle. The models incorporate several types of likely causal factors as independent 
variables: household attributes, measures of the urban form around a household’s 
residential location, and the household’s average daily VMT per vehicle in Phase 1 for each 
of the 7 VMT types (the “base” household VMT for each of the 7 types). The household 
attributes include the number of vehicles owned, household size, employment status, 
and income level. The urban form measures include the spatial location of the household 
residence in the Portland metropolitan region (e.g., distance to downtown and distance to 
the UGB), accessibility to public transit, and development density and land-use mix in the 
neighborhood. The model on Outside Oregon All Days has one extra variable: the network 
distance to the two bridges on the Columbia River that lead to the city of Vancouver in the 
State of Washington. (Table 3 lists all the independent variables used.) 
Table 7 presents the results of the 14 models: one model for each VMT type was run 
for each of the two household types (the Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households). All 
models are the best specifications with the highest adjusted R2. Four urban form variables 
were statistically insignificant and thus were excluded from all the results shown. These 
final models were selected using a backward-delete process: the least significant variable 
was excluded with each successive application of the model, until the adjusted R2 became 
the highest. Comparing these results with the initial models that included all the variables 
shows that the results are almost identical for both approaches to the modeling. Therefore, 
only the reduced models in Table 7 are analyzed in the following discussion.
The overall explanatory power of the models ranges from an adjusted R2 of 0.039 to 0.561, 
indicating that the included independent variables explain 4% to 56% of the variation in the 
dependent variable (the change in VMT). The models were least successful at explaining 
changes in weekday peak VMT within the Portland UGB.
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Portland Weekday Peak models 
For the Peak-Charged households, the only urban form variable significant at the 5% level 
is the Entropy Index, which measures land-use diversity. The negative sign indicates that 
for these households, a mix of land uses helps to further reduce their VMT in peak hours in 
Portland. (Note that the dependent variable here is the VMT change from Phase 1 to Phase 
2.) By contrast, the only significant variable for the Flat-Rate households is accessibility to a 
light rail station, and this is only significant at the 10% level. Surprisingly, the coefficient for 
this variable has a positive sign. In other words, the closer a Flat-Rate household is situated 
to a light rail station, the more it will drive—the opposite of our expectation.
Portland Weekday Off-Peak models
For the Peak-Charged households, the only significant urban form variable (at the 10% 
level) is still the Entropy Index with a negative sign, the same pattern as in the Peak Portland 
model. None of the urban form variables are significant for the Flat-Rate households. One 
other variation between the two household types is that the density variable has opposite 
signs for the Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households, though neither one is significant at 
the 10% level. 
Oregon Low-Fee Weekday models
For the Peak-Charged households, two urban form variables are significant: housing unit 
density (at the 5% level) and the Entropy Index (at the 10% level), both with a negative 
sign. This suggests that density and mixed use could help households reduce VMT under 
a mileage fee with a higher peak charge. For the Flat-Rate households, no urban form 
variables were statistically significant in the final model specification.
Oregon Weekday models
For the Peak-Charged households, two variables are significant: density (at the 10% level) 
and mixed use (at the 5% level). The coefficients for both have the expected signs. For Flat-
Rate households, no variables are significant; in fact, none even remain in the final model.
Oregon Weekend models
For Peak-Charged households, density is significant at the 5% level with the expected 
sign—households facing a penalty on driving will reduce VMT more if they live in a denser 
neighborhood (the dependent variable is the VMT change from Phase 1 to Phase 2). For 
Flat-Rate households, only the Entropy Index remains significant at the 10% level. The 
coefficient has a positive sign, indicating that Flat-Rate households in areas with a higher 
mix of land uses increase VMT more than Flat-Rate households living in neighborhoods 
with less variation in land use. Note that the Entropy Index has opposite signs for Flat-Rate 
and Peak-Charged households, though the latter is insignificant at the 10% level.
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Outside Oregon models
For the Peak-Charged households, the network distance to downtown is significant at 
the 5% level with a positive sign. This suggests that, with a penalty for driving more, 
households living farther away from the Portland downtown are more likely to drive across 
the state border to avoid the penalty. The Entropy Index is significant at the 10% level with 
a positive sign, suggesting that Flat-Rate households living in mixed-use neighborhoods 
tend to increase their Outside Oregon All Days VMT more than other Flat-Rate households. 
Note that the network distance to downtown again has opposite signs between Flat-Rate 
and Peak-Charged households, though neither variable is significant.
Overall VMT models
For the Peak-Charged households, density is significant at the 5% level with an expected 
sign; dense developments help households to further reduce their overall VMT when a 
penalty is charged in peak hours in Portland. The Entropy Index coefficients have opposite 
signs for the Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households, though both of them are insignificant 
at the 10% level.
Summary
In summary, the results confirm Hypothesis 3. They reveal that density and mixed-use 
are often statistically significant, with a negative sign for Peak-Charged households. This 
suggests that when the travel cost increases in peak hours in Portland, households living 
in denser and mixed-use neighborhoods are able to reduce their VMT more than those not 
living in these neighborhoods, possibly due to the alternative destinations available nearby 
and the availability of alternative modes of travel.
However, the models also suggest that the urban form effects on Flat-Rate households 
are totally different from those on Peak-Charged households. For a Flat-Rate household, 
density and mixed-use tend to encourage, not discourage driving. A possible explanation 
for this surprising finding—which contradicts the expectation that participants would reduce 
VMT to save money on fees—is proposed at the end of the chapter.
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4: Replacing the gas tax with a mileage fee reinforces the influence of urban 
form on households’ travel patterns, perhaps because such a fee establishes a stronger 
and more prominent connection between travel cost and travel distance than does a gas 
tax.
To test this hypothesis, two types of models were developed: one with and one without 
the urban form variables. The difference between the adjusted R2 values for each model 
indicates how much the urban form variables contribute to explaining the variation in the 
average daily VMT per household vehicle, among all households within that household 
group. The two models are applied to all seven types of VMT for both types of households 
(Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged) and for both time periods (Phase 1 and Phase 2).22 For 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
28 Analysis and Findings
comparison, the Phase 1 and Phase 2 models have the same structure. The VMT base 
variable is not included in either model. Table 8 presents both the absolute contribution 
made by the urban form variables (the difference in the adjusted R2 values), and also the 
share (percent) of the contribution by the urban form variables (the difference between 
the two adjusted R2 values divided by the adjusted R2 value for the model containing all 
variables). 
Table 8 summarizes the 56 values (2 households x 7 VMT types x 2 phases x 2 adjusted 
R2 values = 56). For example, in Phase 2, adding the urban form variables adds a value 
of 4 percentage points to the adjusted R2 for the model for Overall VMT for the Flat-
Rate households, and these percentage points account for 22% of the overall variation 
explained by the model with the urban form variables. The same values for the Peak-
Charged households are 14 percentage points and 49%, respectively.
Overall, adding the urban form variables improves the adjusted R2 values by 3 to 15 
percentage points for the Flat-Rate households and generally a bit more (4 to 22 percentage 
points) for the Peak-Charged households. (Note that the change in the adjusted R2 values 
is higher for the Peak-Charged households in all but one of the 14 models.)
The difference-in-difference method is used to test the degree to which the urban form 
variables explain the difference from Phase 1 to Phase 2 in average daily VMT per 
household vehicle for the Peak-Charged versus the Flat-Rate households. The percentage 
point difference in the adjusted R2 values between Phase 1 and 2 for the Flat-Rate 
households is compared to the same values for the Peak-Charged households. Table 9 
presents these 14 values. For example, for Overall VMT, the contribution that the urban 
form variables make to explaining household VMT is 8.9 percentage points higher for 
the Peak-Charged households than for the Flat-Rate households, while the share of the 
urban form contribution (compared to the model with just the demographic and base VMT 
variables) increases by 38.8 percentage points.
In summary, the findings mostly confirm Hypothesis 4. Table 9 suggests that the peak 
charge enhances the influence of urban form on four of the seven types of household VMT 
and reduces the influence of urban form on the other three, which are Portland Weekday 
Off-Peak VMT, Oregon Low-Fee Weekday VMT, and Outside Oregon All Days VMT. 
However, even for these three types of VMT, the influence of the urban form variables is 
higher for the Peak-Charged households than for the Flat-Rate households.
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Table 8. Contribution of Urban Form Variables to the Explained Variation in Aver-
age Daily Household VMT per Vehicle
Portland 
Weekday 
Peak
Portland 
Weekday 
Off-Peak
Oregon 
Low-Fee 
Weekday
Oregon 
Weekday
Oregon 
Weekend
Outside 
Oregon Overall
P1a P2b P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2
Flat-Rate HHs
Absolutec 10 3 5 3 9 4 11 5 5 3 8 15 12 4
Shared (%) 
30 10 51 10 82 27 55 20 19 14 100 61 58 22
Peak-Charged HHs
Absolute 16 14 9 6 18 11 22 20 4 7 22 12 12 14
Share (%) 53 59 71 50 91 84 77 74 22 37 68 93 47 49
a Phase 1: Mid-June to mid-November, 2006.
b Phase 2: Mid-November 2006 to mid-March 2007.
c The absolute difference between the two adjusted R2 values – i.e., the R2 value of the first model minus the R2 value 
of the second model.
d The difference between the two adjusted R2 values, divided by the adjusted R2 value for the model containing all 
variables.
Table 9. Effect of the Peak-Charge Fee Design on the Urban Form Contribution to 
Household VMT (in Percentage Points)a
Portland 
Weekday 
Peak
Portland 
Weekday 
Off-Peak
Oregon 
Low-Fee 
Weekday
Oregon 
Weekday
Oregon 
Weekend
Outside 
Oregon Overall
Change of 
contribution
4.1 -0.3 -1.1 3.7 5.1 -16.1 8.9
Change of 
share of con-
tribution 
26.1 20.4 48.1 32.3 19.4 64.1 38.8
a The values expressed are the adjusted R2 values for the Peak-Charged households (Phase 1 - Phase 2) minus Flat-
Rate households (Phase 1 - Phase 2).
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RETHINKING THE PROGRAM: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE MILEAGE 
FEE PROGRAM’S COST STRUCTURE FOR PARTICIPANTS AND THE URBAN 
FORM EFFECT
One key feature of the Portland pilot program was the establishment of an endowment 
account for each enrolled vehicle, a common practice of pilot programs such as this. As 
described earlier, the amount of money in the account was calculated by ODOT using a 
formula based on the household’s VMT in Phase 1 and the fee structure in Phase 2. For 
a Flat-Rate household, the account value was set as its total Oregon mileage in Phase 1 
multiplied by 1.2 cents per mile. For a Peak-Charged household, the account value was 
set as the sum of (1) the Portland Weekday Peak mileage in Phase 1 multiplied by 10 
cents per mile and (2) all other miles driven in Oregon in Phase 1 multiplied by 0.43 cents 
per mile. Therefore, if a household’s driving pattern remained the same in Phase 2 as in 
Phase 1, the endowment account balance would approximately equal zero at the end 
of Phase 2.23 The average amount of money deposited in the endowment accounts was 
$51.50 for a Flat-Rate household and $123.20 for a Peak-Charged household.24
The program designers included the endowment account for two reasons. First, the 
accounts provided a logistically simple way for participating households to pay the mileage 
fee in Phase 2. Also, this element of the program design helped recruit participants by 
ensuring that their participation wouldn’t cost them money out-of-pocket. Second, the 
endowment accounts created an incentive for households to reduce their VMT in Phase 2. 
If a household reduced VMT in Phase 2, any endowment balance remaining at the end 
was granted to the household. Building such a financial incentive into the program was 
important, since in Phase 2 the households were paying neither the mileage fee nor the 
gas tax with their own money. During the program, ODOT notified participants of their 
endowment balances every few weeks, giving them information that could help them 
modify their driving habits in order to reduce the mileage fee charged to their account 
balance and maximize their reward at the completion of the pilot program.25 However, if a 
household drove more in Phase 2 than in Phase 1 and used up all the endowment account 
money, it was not required to pay off this “debt.”26  
Although the initial purpose of the endowment accounts was to provide a real-life incentive 
for households to save money by driving a bit less, evaluations of the mileage fee program 
have not tested whether households actually reacted as expected. Given the complex 
cost structure of the Portland program, we suspected that this signal might be too weak or 
ambiguous to effectively encourage households to reduce VMT.
Therefore, we decided to test the endowment-account effect by including the starting 
value of each household’s endowment account as a variable in the seven VMT models 
for both Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households and comparing the result with the 
original models run without this variable. We found that the cost structure of the Portland 
program, especially the endowment account feature, sent multiple signals to participating 
households that, on balance, actually encouraged Flat-Rate households to increase their 
average daily VMT per household vehicle in Phase 2, as compared to Phase 1, but had 
little effect on Peak-Charged households.
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Evaluating the Effect of the Endowment Account
To test this hypothesis, four types of variables were tested in the seven VMT models: 
household attributes, urban form measures, the household’s Phase 1 base VMT (average 
daily VMT per household vehicle), and the value of the household’s endowment account 
at the beginning of Phase 2. Model 1 includes the first three types of variables and Model 
2 adds the endowment account variable. The regression results are summarized in 
Table 10 for Flat-Rate households and in Table 11 for Peak-Charged households. Only 
the estimations of the base VMT in Phase 1 and the endowment account variables are 
presented in the tables. 
Before analyzing the result, the relationship between the Phase 1 base VMT and the 
endowment account should be clarified. First, including the base VMT is necessary to 
control for the fact that the households were not randomly assigned to the Flat-Rate and 
Peak-Charged groups; their assignment was based partly on their Phase 1 base VMT. 
Second, we tested and confirmed that the base VMT and the endowment account are not 
highly correlated. (There was no correlation because the mileage used to calculate the 
endowment account money is not one of the seven types of mileage used for this study.27)
As Table 10 and Table 11 show, the endowment account proves insignificant in all the 
models for the Peak-Charged Households. By contrast, for the Flat-Rate households the 
endowment account variable is significant in the models for four types of VMT. In each 
case the coefficient is positive, indicating that the endowment account money is associated 
with driving more, not less, in Phase 2. For example, one extra dollar in the endowment 
account is associated with an increase of 0.235 Overall VMT miles from Phase 1 to Phase 
2 (Table 10, last column).
Another interesting observation about the Flat-Rate households is that when the endowment 
account variable is included, the coefficient for the base VMT variable increases in absolute 
value. This further proves that the base VMT and endowment account have opposite 
effects on the dependent variable. The estimations of the base VMT in Model 2 capture 
the real effect of seasonal VMT change while those in the Model 1, without the endowment 
account, underestimate that effect. For example, for Overall VMT, Model 1 shows that a 
Flat-Rate household normally would reduce average daily VMT by 0.256 miles in Phase 
2 for each mile driven in Phase 1. However, Model 2 shows that this 0.256-mile drop is 
actually caused by a reduction of 0.628 miles from each Phase 1 Base VMT mile (due to 
the seasonal change), combined with an increase of 0.235 miles per dollar in the starting 
value of the endowment account.
For a typical Flat-Rate household with the median overall daily VMT in Phase 1 (26.8 
miles) and the median endowment account value ($45.2), about 63%28 of the seasonal 
reduction in VMT that would otherwise be expected is offset by the growth in VMT induced 
by the endowment account. In other words, a household’s Phase 2 VMT reduction would 
be 63% greater if the endowment account were completely removed.
Further inspection of Table 10 shows that the effect of the endowment account varies among 
the 7 different VMT models. Note that the endowment account variable is insignificant in 
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two of the different VMT models (the Portland Weekday Peak and Portland Weekday Off-
Peak models), and only significant at the 10% level in the Oregon Weekday model. This 
result suggests that the endowment account affects primarily non-commuting travel—i.e., 
travel outside Portland during the peak times, travel on weekends, and travel outside 
Oregon. Such a finding makes intuitive sense; households most likely are traveling for 
non-work purposes in these conditions, and trips for which the members likely have more 
flexible travel schedules.
Finally, note that for Flat-Rate households, when the endowment account is significant, 
the goodness-of-fit (adjusted R2) of the model improves dramatically—by an average of 
30% compared to the models without the endowment account.
Behavioral Explanation 
In order to understand the different behavioral responses from Flat-Rate and Peak-
Charged households, it is useful to look at how the money in their endowment accounts 
was finally distributed between mileage fee payments and cash rewards to participants. 
This analysis suggests how the participating households used the endowment money 
(e.g., as a potential cash reward vs. as a fund for payment for VMT fee). 
For the Flat-Rate households, the endowment account money was spent in two ways: 
part of the money covered all the mileage fee charges the household accrued in Phase 2, 
and the remainder was granted to the household at the end of Phase 2 as a cash reward 
(Figure 3a). On average, 64% of the endowment account money was spent on the VMT 
fee charges, and 36% went to the household as a cash reward.29
Cash Reward 
(36%)
Mileage Charges 
(64%)
Cash Reward 
(41%)
Peak-Hour  
Mileage Charges 
(51%)
Low-Rate 
Mileage Charges 
(51%)
(a) Flat-Rate Households (b) Peak-Charged Households
Figure 3. Average Distribution of Funds in the Endowment Accounts for Flat-Rate 
and Peak-Charged Households
Source: Calculated by the authors using the mileage data provided by ODOT.
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For the Peak-Charged households, the endowment account money was divided among 
three expenditures: the 10-cents-per-mile fee applied to all Portland Weekday Peak 
mileage, the reduced mileage fee for all other Oregon mileage, and the cash reward to 
participants (Figure 3b). The money was, on average, divided as follows: 51% covered 
the peak-hour mileage charges, 8% covered the low-rate mileage charges, and 41% was 
given to the household as a cash reward. 
The average values for all households presented mask the fairly significant variation in 
how the endowment account money was spent among households. Figure 4 shows the 
distribution of the percent of endowment money spent paying mileage fee charges for 
both Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households. In both groups, the majority of households 
spent 50% to 80% of the money to pay mileage fee charges, but a few households spent 
only 10% to 20%, and there were five households in each group that actually overspent 
their endowment money (on average, 119% for the five Flat-Rate households and 113% 
for the five Peak-Charged households). The great variation indicates that the assumption 
that all households will treat the endowment account uniformly as an incentive to reduce 
driving does not hold.
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Percentage of Endowment Account Spent as Mileage Fee 
Frequency
Flat-Rate Households (N=62) Peak-Charged Households (N=68)
Figure 4. The Distribution of the Share of Endowment Account Spent to Pay the 
Mileage Fee for Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged Households
Given this vast difference in the usage of the endowment money, we assume that 
participating households may not all view the money the same way. For example, for 
a household that used only 10% of the money, this endowment account is more like a 
cash reward for its VMT reduction. For a household that used 90% of the money to cover 
mileage fees, the endowment account is more like a subsidy from the government to 
cover gas tax costs. Although each household falls in a different place along this reward-
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to-subsidy spectrum, there is a clear difference between the Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged 
households. 
For the Flat-Rate households, the majority of the endowment account money (64%) was 
used to pay a mileage fee, a replacement for the gas tax. All participating households 
were informed that the fee was set up as equivalent to the gas tax—they would not pay 
more money under the new fee scheme. This payment was provided by the government 
at no cost to the participating households, effectively lowering the price of gas for them.
It is likely that the lowered gas prices proved a more salient financial incentive for 
participants than did the potential to keep unspent money from the endowment account. 
When households do not need to pay the gas tax at the pump, this provides a direct and 
immediate savings. And this price reduction was not minor. In Oregon, the state gas tax 
is 24 cents per gallon, while the average gas price in the West Coast in Phase 2 was 
$2.51 per gallon30. Therefore, all Flat-Rate participants enjoyed a 9.6% reduction in the 
price they paid at the pump during Phase 2. At the same time, the potential “cash reward” 
from the endowment account was likely much less salient and visible to the participants. 
Participants could not check the account balance by themselves, and the “reward” money 
they received if they reduced their VMT was available only at some unknown (to them) 
future date, after the program ended. Finally, even if households thought directly about the 
cost of the mileage fee when making travel decisions, the rate of 1.2 cents per mile most 
likely sounded too trivial to provide a clear incentive to reduce VMT.
The salience of price on consumer behavior has been well documented in the behavioral 
economics literature. For example, Chetty et al. found that consumption decreases 
substantially when sales tax is included in the displayed price, even though consumers 
would pay the same total price either way. The authors ran an experiment using 750 
distinct products at a supermarket in Northern California over a three-week period, with a 
state sales tax of 7.375%. Consumers spent 8% less when the price tags showed the final 
price, including sales tax.31
The findings from the modeling appear to contradict the assumption by the program 
designers that the endowment account should not have impacted household VMT at all. 
As the modeling indicates, the endowment accounts did influence behavior, although the 
direction of the effect is counterintuitive (the larger the endowment account and potential 
cash reward, the greater the household’s VMT). This apparent contradiction between the 
modeling results and the assumption can be explained by reexamining what the endowment 
account variable actually represents. We suspect the endowment account variable was 
significant because it served as a proxy for the household’s savings in expenditures on 
gasoline during Phase 2, not because households were influenced by the prospect of 
receiving money left in the endowment account itself. In other words, the variable probably 
should be relabeled along the lines of “Potential Savings in Gasoline Expenditures.”
This reasoning, which could explain the behavior of the flat rate households, does not 
work for the Peak-Charged households. The modeling results show the latter to be 
uninfluenced by the endowment account variable (or its counterpart, the savings in gas 
expenditures). Why might this be? First, about half (51%) of the endowment money was 
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spent on a congestion charge, a price nine times higher than the gas tax in Phase 1. This 
congestion charge also accounts for 86% (51% / 59% = 0.86) of all endowment money 
spent on mileage fee charges. While Peak-Charged households still paid no gas tax at the 
pump, it was probably hard for them to view the endowment money spent on the mileage 
fee as a replacement for the gas tax. Instead, they probably perceived the endowment 
account money spent on peak-charged VMT as a penalty on driving, an incentive which 
might be as salient as the direct savings at the pump. This reasoning may explain why the 
endowment account variable is insignificant for Peak-Charged households in Table 10. 
Most models (five out of seven) do not even have the variable in the final specification, 
and when they do, the coefficients show opposite signs, indicating that the endowment 
account had no apparent influence on driving behavior.
In summary, by artificially lowering the cost of gas, the cost structure of the Portland 
program may have encouraged Flat-Rate households to increase their VMT in Phase 2. 
This suggests that the program results underestimated the effect of a flat-rate mileage fee 
on VMT reduction. Based on our analysis, the reduction could have been 63% greater for 
Flat-Rate households if the mileage fees had been incorporated into the price of gasoline 
paid at the pump.32 The same underestimation may have occurred with Peak-Charged 
households, but we are unable to detect it due to the mixed effects of the reduced gas 
price at the pump and the high congestion charge.
This result also sheds light on the likely effects that could be expected from an actual 
statewide or national mileage fee. First, because households would pay the mileage fee 
with their own money, a real program should lead to a larger VMT reduction than that 
observed in the Portland program, under either a flat-rate or variable-charged rate scheme. 
Second, if the mileage fee is not paid at the pump and is paid only infrequently—for 
example, once per month—the mileage-fee program may inadvertently encourage people 
to drive more, since the gas price reduction at the pump may prove a stronger incentive 
than the charges paid a month later with a credit card. The timing of payment is thus a key 
issue in determining the how a mileage fee program will impact overall VMT.
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CONCLUSION
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
A key finding is that the mileage fee program led some households to reduce their overall 
VMT. The results showed significant VMT reductions in Portland Weekday Peak and 
Oregon Weekday VMT. There appears to have been no corresponding spillover effects to 
Portland Weekday Off-Peak or Oregon Low-Fee Weekday VMT. The lack of compensating 
spillover travel may be explained by multiple factors. For example, the UGB in Portland 
has prevented most development from occurring outside the congestion charge zone, so 
there are few substitutive destinations outside the UGB, at least within Oregon. Without 
the UGB, the likelihood of a spillover effect might have been greater. A second possibility is 
that people’s travel schedules are less flexible on weekdays, making it impractical for them 
to increase weekday off-peak travel  to compensate for reduced peak-hour travel. Finally, 
the analysis was unable to draw any conclusions about whether there were any spillover 
increases in Oregon Weekend and Outside Oregon VMT.
Second, the analysis also provides evidence that a mileage fee with a variable rate could 
potentially strengthen the interaction between urban form and travel decisions. The urban 
form measures were more influential in explaining household VMT for the households 
charged a variable mileage-fee than for households charged a flat-rate fee. This finding 
about the impact of the urban form variables held for the results measured both in 
absolute miles and percentage terms. Those Peak-Charged households located in denser 
neighborhoods with a mix of land uses reduced VMT more than Peak-Charged households 
located in other types of neighborhoods. For the Flat-Rate households, however, the 
opposite occurred: those households in higher density, mixed-use neighborhoods actually 
increased their VMT after the mileage fee was introduced.
A last significant finding is that the program design seems to have sent conflicting incentives 
to the participating households in terms of whether they should increase or reduce VMT in 
Phase 2. We suspect that the elimination of gas taxes from the price of gas encouraged Flat-
Rate households to drive more instead of less because gas essentially become cheaper. 
Such an effect disappears for Peak-Charged households, however, perhaps because the 
high rate of the peak-hour mileage charge proved such a strong stimulus to reduce driving 
that it outweighed the incentive provided by the lower gas prices to drive more. The effect 
of the program design might help explain the unexpected findings that density and mixed 
uses were associated with increased VMT for the Flat-Rate households.
The findings presented in this report are somewhat, but not entirely, consistent with those 
of Rufolo and Kimpel’s analyses of the Oregon Mileage Fee program,33 though it is not 
possible to make a direct comparison because of differences in research design. First, 
Rufolo and Kimpel also did not find any spillover (increase) of VMT to off-peak hours. 
Rather, they actually found a further decrease of VMT in off-peak hours. Second, they found 
that access to public transit as measured by the network distance to frequently served 
bus stops affected VMT changes, which complements our findings about the influence of 
urban form variables.34  While we did not find any significant associations between transit 
proximity and reduced VMT, we did see a relationship with density and mixed land uses. 
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Transit service is generally higher in areas of higher density, which makes the finding 
consistent with Rufolo and Kimpel.
LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY
When considering the findings from the study, it is important to keep in mind the limitations 
of the data. The participants were not randomly selected, and the sample size was 
relatively small. However, we believe these limitations are likely irrelevant to our analysis 
for several reasons. First, we compared two groups of households within the sample, rather 
than comparing the sample with the general population. Second, we see no compelling 
theoretical argument for why the urban form effect should be correlated to people’s decision 
to participate in the program. Only a few people mentioned environmental concerns as the 
reason they participated in the program, while most listed money, curiosity, and the dislike 
of gas taxes as main reasons to participate. Third, there is no obvious reason why the 
general population would respond differently to the financial incentives set up in the pilot 
program through the endowment account and the elimination of the gas tax. In sum, the 
study findings seem likely to hold for the general population, though that conclusion would 
need to be confirmed with additional research, particularly with data from a program that 
overcomes some of these limitations.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The study results suggest several implications for transportation policymakers. First 
and foremost, charging a noticeably higher fee for driving in congested conditions can 
successfully motivate households to reduce their VMT in those times and places where 
congestion is most a problem. 
Second, the spillover effect of a variable charge might be less than expected. The study 
found no evident spillover of VMT to off-peak hours on a weekday, perhaps indicating 
that households are relatively unwilling to change their weekday travel patterns . The 
study also found no spillover of VMT to the areas outside the peak-charged zone, though 
this finding might be unique to the Portland metropolitan area because its UGB has kept 
most development out of the land surrounding the metro region. Without such a boundary, 
spillover to outside areas might be more likely to occur.
Third, in terms of the connection between urban form, the mileage fee, and travel behavior, 
households in all types of neighborhoods will likely reduce their peak-hour and overall 
travel under a charging scheme that charges a high-rate for peak-hour travel, though 
households in higher-density neighborhoods with a mix of land uses will likely make greater 
reductions in VMT.
Fourth, the study findings suggest that a mileage fee program that charges a high rate 
during the peak hour will likely strengthen the underlying influence of urban form on travel 
behavior as compared to the current gas tax system. In other words, urban form patterns 
will affect travel behavior more than they currently do if the nation shifts to a new system 
of mileage charges that vary by congestion levels. For planners, this finding suggests that 
switching from fuel taxes to mileage taxes would strengthen the power of land-use planning 
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as a policy tool to shift some travel from solo driving trips to more sustainable modes. 
Also, this finding about the link between urban form and travel behavior in response to 
a mileage fee implies that mileage-fee program designers will need to carefully consider 
both current and future urban form patterns when estimating the likely revenues collected 
from mileage fees and also the potential impact of the fees on congestion levels.
Fifth, the study findings suggest that residents in lower-density suburban areas, as well as 
residents in higher-density and more mixed-use neighborhoods, are able to reduce their 
driving in response to a mileage fee. Therefore, the results add new empirical evidence to 
the ongoing equity debate about whether mileage fees are unfair to households living in 
suburban communities and suggests that this concern may not be warranted. However, 
none of the study’s households lived in rural areas, and Portland’s UGB may result in 
higher suburban densities than those found in other metropolitan regions. Therefore, the 
applicability of the findings with respect to geographical equity is somewhat limited.
Sixth, although a peak-hour mileage charge could encourage drivers to think carefully about 
their travel decisions and they would probably reduce their VMT accordingly, the ultimate 
program impacts on VMT will likely depend on the specific program design, especially the 
timing of the mileage fee payment. If drivers pay mileage fees less frequently than they 
currently pay gas taxes at the pump—e.g., if they’re billed monthly—they may increase 
instead of decrease their VMT. Policymakers will want to pay attention to the psychological 
aspects of the program design in order to best achieve their policy goals.
Seventh, these findings about the program design suggest that the results of the Portland 
pilot program may have underestimated the effect of a mileage fee on VMT reduction. If 
the mileage fee had been added to the price of the gas at the pump rather than billed later, 
participants might have reduced their VMT more.
Finally, the analysis of the program design’s incentives may explain the apparently 
“inconsistent” impact of the urban form variables on the behavior of the Flat-Rate and 
Peak-Charged households in Hypothesis 3. This analysis found that some of the urban 
form variables (density, transit access, and mixed land use) had an unexpected positive 
coefficient for Flat-Rate households, though the positive coefficients are insignificant at 
the 10% level in all models except for the Oregon Weekend one. Although the evidence is 
not strong, these results suggest that with the incentive to drive more provided by a drop 
in gas prices, households in denser, mixed-use, and transit-accessible neighborhoods 
might increase their VMT more than would households in other types of neighborhoods. 
Theoretically, this argument is actually consistent with Hypothesis 3: if households in 
dense and transit-accessible areas are more elastic to travel cost than those who live in 
lower-density neighborhoods without good transit service, then the former households 
should reduce VMT more when travel cost increases and also increase VMT more when 
travel cost decreases. Further analysis is necessary to test this hypothesis. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In terms of future research, two issues need to be analyzed to better understand the 
effectiveness of a mileage-base fee program. The first is the behavioral analysis related 
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to the endowment account. Such an analysis should cover both objective usage and 
subjective perception of the endowment money. The Oregon pilot program dataset is 
unable to support such analysis. A second issue for further research is the potential for 
spillover VMT on weekends and/or outside the zone where the mileage fee is charged. This 
research could neither prove nor disprove spillover in these latter cases due to limitation 
of the data—the sample size is too small. However, this issue is critical to understanding 
the overall effect on VMT that could be expected from a mileage fee program that was 
applied at any geographical scale other than nationwide. Finally, testing a mileage fee in 
other geographic areas, including rural ones, would help further address questions about 
equity impacts.
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14. For a Flat-Rate household, the value of the endowment account was calculated as the 
total Oregon mileage in Phase 1 multiplied by the VMT fee of 1.2 cents per mile. For 
a Peak-Charged household, the account was calculated as the sum of the mileage in 
the peak period that was driven within the Portland UGB, plus the non-peak Oregon 
mileage in Phase 1, each multiplied by their respective VMT fees. Source: Anthony M. 
Rufolo and Thomas J. Kimpel. “Responses to Oregon’s Experiment in Road Pricing,” 
Transportation Research Record 2079 (2008): 1-7; James M. Whitty, Oregon’s Mileage 
Fee Concept and Road User Fee Pilot Program: Final Report (Oregon Department of 
Transportation, November 2007): 25.
15. James M. Whitty, Oregon’s Mileage Fee Concept and Road User Fee Pilot Program: 
Final Report (Oregon Department of Transportation, November 2007): 25.
16. Anthony Rufolo, email message to authors, April 6, 2010.
17. Anthony M. Rufolo and Thomas J. Kimpel, “Responses to Oregon’s Experiment in 
Road Pricing,” Transportation Research Record 2079 (2008): 2.
18. See, for example: Robert Cervero and Kara Kockelman, “Travel Demand and the 
3Ds: Density, Diversity, and Design,” Transportation Research D 2, no. 3 (1997): 199– 
219; Reid Ewing and Robert Cervero, “Travel and the Built Environment: A Synthesis,” 
Transportation Research Record 1780 (2001): 87-114; Yan Song and Gerrit J. 
Knaap, “Measuring the Effects of Mixed Land Uses on Housing Values,” Regional 
Science and Urban Economics 34, no. 6 (2004): 663-680; Susan Handy, Xinyu Cao, 
and Patricia Mokhtarian, “Correlation or Causality between the Built Environment 
and Travel Behavior? Evidence from Northern California,” Transportation Research 
Part D 10, no. 6 (2005): 427–444; Daniel A. Rodríguez, Asad J. Khattak, and Kelly 
R. Evenson, “Can New Urbanism Encourage Physical Activity? Comparing a New 
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Urbanist Neighborhood with Conventional Suburbs,” Journal of the American Planning 
Association 72, no.1 (2006): 43-56; Ross Brownson, Christy Hoehner, Kristin Day, 
Ann Forsyth, and Jim Sallis, “Measuring the Built Environment for Physical Activity: 
State of the Art,” American Journal of Preventive Medicine 36, no. 4 (2009): 99-123.
19. Scott M. Festin, Summary of National and Regional Travel Trends: 1970-1995 
(Washington, D.C.: Federal Highway Administration, May 1996), http://www.fhwa.dot.
gov/ohim/bluebook.pdf (accessed September 10, 2010).
20. Oregon Department of Transportation Automatic Traffic Recorders Database. Emailed 
via Don R. Crownover, ODOT Traffic Monitoring Unit, April 2, 2010. ATR #: 26-004, 
26-002, 26-014, 26-015, 26-016, 26-018, 26-022, 26-024, 26-027.
21. Bruce Meyer, “Natural and Quasi-Natural Experiments in Economics,” Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 13, no. 2 (1995): 151-161.
22. The only difference between the models for Phase 1 and Phase 2 is that the Phase 1 
models do not include the “Phase 1 base VMT” variable.
23. As mentioned in the previous section, ODOT actually set the endowment amount 
to be a little bit higher than this formula out of concern that when the money in the 
endowment account was used up, the participating household might quit the program. 
Participants were not informed how the initial value of the endowment account was 
determined. (Source: Anthony Rufulo, e-mail message to authors, April 8, 2010.)
24. Although the starting value of the accounts does not seem large, we do not know 
how it was perceived by the participants.  About 70% of participants listed money as 
one of the reasons they chose to participate in the program. In addition to receiving 
the remaining value of the endowment account at the end of Phase 2, participants 
received two other monetary incentives: $300 per vehicle to install a GPS device and 
a $40 gasoline voucher.
25. James M. Whitty, Oregon’s Mileage Fee Concept and Road User Fee Pilot Program: 
Final Report (Oregon Department of Transportation, November 2007): 25.
26. Source: Anthony Rufulo, email message to authors, April 6, 2010.
27. The starting value of the endowment account was calculated based on the VMT inside 
Oregon for both weekdays and weekends in Phase 1. This particular type of VMT is 
not highly correlated with the seven types of VMT used in this research. For all the 
models in Table 10 and Table 11 for which the endowment account variable remains 
significant, the Pearson’s correlation value ranges from 0.25 to 0.62 for the Flat-Rate 
households and 0.11 to 0.45 for the Peak-Charge households.
28. 0.235 mile/$ x $45.2
=
10.62 miles
= 0.63
0.628 mile/Phase 1 miles x 26.8 Phase 1 miles 16.83 miles
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29. Source: Calculated by the authors based on the household VMT data collected by 
ODOT.
30. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Retail Gasoline Historical Price. Available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/wrgp/mogas_history.html 
31. Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft, “Salience and Taxation: Theory and 
Evidence,” American Economic Review 99, no. 4 (2009): 1145-1177.
32. This value is significantly higher than the typical gas price elasticity found in other 
studies, though this value is not exactly elasticity. For example, Hughes et al. found 
that gas price elasticity ranged from -0.034 to -0.077 during 2001 and 2006. We 
suggest two possible explanations. First, the participants in this program may not 
be representative of the general population. Monetary compensation was mentioned 
as one of the major reasons why they participated in this pilot study. They might be 
more sensitive to price. Second, we suspect that perhaps the elimination of gas tax 
posed an additional incentive beyond the mere price reduction, though we do not have 
evidence to support the argument.
33. Anthony M. Rufolo and Thomas J. Kimpel, “Responses to Oregon’s Experiment in 
Road Pricing,” Transportation Research Record 2079 (2008), 159-166; Anthony M. 
Rufolo and Thomas J. Kimpel, “Transit’s Effect on Mileage Responses to Oregon’s 
Experiment in Road Pricing,” Transportation Research Record 2115 (2009): 60-65.
34. There are three key differences in research design. First, for this report the unit of 
analysis is the average VMT per vehicle for each household, whereas Rufolo and 
Kimpel’s studies looked at average VMT per individual vehicle. Second, this study 
analyzed the Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged households in separate models, while 
Rufolo and Kimpel combined them together with dummy variables of groups. Third, 
Rufolo and Kimpel compared Phase 1 and Phase 2 to identify the program effect, while 
this study compared the difference between Flat-Rate and Peak-Charged household 
to identify the effect of peak charge.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
DOE Department of Energy 
FR Flat-Rate
GPS Global Positioning System 
HH Household 
ODOT Oregon Department of Transportation
P1 Phase 1
P2 Phase 2
PC Peak-Charged
RLIS Regional Land Information System 
UGB Urban Growth Boundary
VMT Vehicle Miles Traveled
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
46 Abbreviations and Acronyms
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
47
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abou-Zeid, Maya, Moshe E. Ben-Akiva, Kevin F. Tierney, Kenneth R. Buckeye, 
and Jeffrey N. Buxbaum. “Minnesota Pay-As-You-Drive Pricing Experiment.” 
Transportation Research Record 2079 (2008): 8-14.
Brownson, Ross, Christy Hoehner, Kristin Day, Ann Forsyth, and Jim Sallis. “Measuring 
the Built Environment for Physical Activity: State of the Art.” American Journal of 
Preventive Medicine 36, no. 4 (2009): 99-123.
Cervero, Robert, and Kara Kockelman. “Travel Demand and the 3Ds: Density, Diversity, 
and Design.” Transportation Research D 2, no. 3 (1997): 199– 219.
Chetty, Raj, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft. “Salience and Taxation: Theory and 
Evidence.” American Economic Review 99, no. 4 (2009): 1145-1177.
Ewing, Reid, and Robert Cervero. “Travel and the Built Environment: A Synthesis.” 
Transportation Research Record 1780 (2001): 87-114.
Festin, Scott M. “Summary of National and Regional Travel Trends: 1970-1995.” Federal 
Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington D.C., May 
1996. http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/bluebook.pdf (accessed September 10, 2010).
Glaister, Stephen, and Daniel J. Graham. “An Evaluation of National Road User Charging 
in England.” Transportation Research Part A 39, no. 7-9 (2005): 632–650.
Handy, Susan, Xinyu Cao, and Patricia Mokhtarian. “Correlation or Causality between 
the Built Environment and Travel Behavior? Evidence from Northern California.” 
Transportation Research Part D 10, no. 6 (2005): 427–444.
Hughes, Jonathan E., Christopher R. Knittel, and Daniel Sperling. “Evidence of a Shift 
in the Short-Run Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand.” Energy Journal 29, no. 1 
(2008): 113-134.
McMullen, B. Starr, Lei Zhang, and Kyle Nakahara. “Distributional Impacts of Changing 
from a Gasoline Tax to a Vehicle-Mile Tax for Light Vehicles: A Case Study of 
Oregon.” Transport Policy 17, no. 6 (2010): 359-366.
Meyer, Bruce. “Natural and Quasi-Natural Experiments in Economics.” Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 13, no. 2 (1995): 151-161.
National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission (NSTIFC). “Paying 
Our Way: A New Framework for Transportation Finance: Final Report. 2009.” 
http://financecommission.dot.gov/Documents/NSTIF_Commission_Final_Report_
Mar09FNL.pdf (accessed May 28, 2009).
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
48 Bibliography
Puget Sound Regional Council. “Traffic Choices Study: Summary Report.” 2008. http://
www.psrc.org/projects/trafficchoices/summaryreport.pdf (accessed May 21, 2010).
Rodríguez, Daniel A., Asad J. Khattak, and Kelly R. Evenson, “Can New Urbanism 
Encourage Physical Activity? Comparing a New Urbanist Neighborhood with 
Conventional Suburbs.” Journal of the American Planning Association 72, no.1 
(2006): 43-56.
Rufolo, Anthony M., and Thomas J. Kimpel. “Responses to Oregon’s Experiment in 
Road Pricing.” Transportation Research Record 2079 (2008): 1-7.
Rufolo, Anthony M., and Thomas J. Kimpel. “Transit’s Effect on Mileage Responses to 
Oregon’s Experiment in Road Pricing.” Transportation Research Record 2115 
(2009): 60-65.
Song, Yan, and Gerrit J. Knaap. “Measuring the Effects of Mixed Land Uses on Housing 
Values.” Regional Science and Urban Economics 34, no. 6 (2004): 663-680.
Ubbels, Barry, and Erik Verhoef. “Behavioral Responses to Road Pricing: Empirical 
Results from a Survey of Dutch Car Owners.” Transportation Research Record 
1960 (2006):159-166.
Ubbels, Barry, Piet Rietveld, and Paul Peeters. “Environmental Effects of a Kilometre 
Charge in Road Transport: An Investigation for the Netherlands.” Transportation 
Research Part D 7, no. 4 (2002): 255–264.
Whitty, James M. Oregon’s Mileage Fee Concept and Road User Fee Pilot Program: 
Final Report. Oregon Department of Transportation, November 2007.
Whitty James M., and J.R. Svadlenak. “Discerning the Pathway to Implementation of 
a National Mileage-Based Charging System.” Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the Transportation Research Board, Washington, D.C., January 11-15, 
2009.
Zhang, Lei, B. Starr McMullen, Divya Valluri, and Kyle Nakahara. “Vehicle Mileage Fee 
on Income and Spatial Equity: Short- and Long-Run Impacts.” Transportation 
Research Record 2115 (2009): 110-118.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
49
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
ZHAN GUO, PH.D.
Zhan Guo is assistant professor of urban planning and transportation policy at New York 
University. His research has focused on two interesting and interconnected questions: First, 
how does the governmental regulation over the built environment (e.g., land use planning 
and infrastructure investment) limit travel options and encourage one particular travel 
means—car driving? Second, how do travelers perceive different travel options? Could we 
reinforce, change, or even deceive that perception in order to promote the “right” behavior. 
Within this framework, He has conducted empirical studies on pedestrian behavior, public 
transit, and transportation and land use in Boston, Chicago, London, and New York City. 
He has a M.C.P. (2003) and a Ph.D. in Urban Studies and Planning (2008) both from 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
ASHA WEINSTEIN AGRAWAL, PH.D.
Asha Weinstein Agrawal is director of the MTI National Transportation Finance Center 
and also associate professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at San 
José State University. Her research interests in transportation policy and planning include 
transportation finance, pedestrian planning, and urban street design. She also works in 
the area of planning and transportation history. She has a B.A. from Harvard University, an 
MURP from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a Ph.D. from the 
University of California at Berkeley. A complete listing of her publications can be found at 
http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/weinstein.agrawal/.
JENNIFER DILL, PH.D.
Jennifer Dill is associate professor in the Nohad A. Toulan School of Urban Studies and 
Planning at Portland State University and director of the Oregon Transportation Research 
and Education Consortium (OTREC), a national university transportation center. Dr. Dill 
has a Ph.D. in City and Regional Planning from the University of California at Berkeley, 
an M.A. in Urban Planning from UCLA, and a B.S. in Environmental Policy Analysis and 
Planning from the University of California at Davis. She teaches courses in transportation 
policy and urban planning methods. Dr. Dill’s research interests include the relationship 
between transportation policy and planning and land use, health, and the environment, 
travel behavior, and transportation finance.
MEGAN QUIRK
Megan Quirk is a graduate student at New York University’s Wagner School of Public 
Service. Her study interests include alternative modes of transportation, street design, and 
smart growth. Prior to Wagner, she spent several years working in book publishing as a 
nonfiction editor. She received her B.A. in Economics from Smith College.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
50 About the Authors
MELISSA REESE
Melissa Reese is a candidate for a Masters of Urban Planning degree, with an international 
specialization, at New York University’s Wagner School of Public Service. She received her 
Bachelors of Urban and Environmental Planning from the University of Virginia in 2009. 
Her professional interests include GIS applications for domestic urban planning issues, 
participatory applications of GIS in less developed countries, and land tenure issues in 
informal settlements abroad.  
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
51
PEER  REVIEW
San José State University, of the California State University system, and the MTI Board of 
Trustees have agreed upon a peer review process required for all research published by 
MTI. The purpose of the review process is to ensure that the results presented are based 
upon a professionally acceptable research protocol.
Research projects begin with the approval of a scope of work by the sponsoring entities, 
with in-process reviews by the MTI Research Director and the Research Associated Policy 
Oversight Committee (RAPOC). Review of the draft research product is conducted by the 
Research Committee of the Board of Trustees and may include invited critiques from other 
professionals in the subject field. The review is based on the professional propriety of the 
research methodology.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
52 Peer  Review
The Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies (MTI) was established by Congress as part 
of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. Reauthorized in 1998, MTI was selected by the U.S. Department 
of Transportation through a competitive process in 2002 as a national “Center of Excellence.” The Institute is funded by Con-
gress through the United States Department of Transportation’s Research and Innovative Technology Administration, the Califor-
nia Legislature through the Department of Transportation (Caltrans), and by private grants and donations. 
The Institute receives oversight from an internationally respected Board of Trustees whose members represent all major surface 
transportation modes. MTI’s focus on policy and management resulted from a Board assessment of the industry’s unmet needs 
and led directly to the choice of the San José State University College of Business as the Institute’s home.  The Board provides 
policy direction, assists with needs assessment, and connects the Institute and its programs with the international transportation 
community. 
MTI’s transportation policy work is centered on three primary responsibilities: 
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
Research 
MTI works to provide policy-oriented research for all levels of 
government and the private sector to foster the development 
of optimum surface transportation systems. Research areas 
include: transportation security; planning and policy develop-
ment; interrelationships among transportation, land use, and the 
environment; transportation finance; and collaborative labor-
management relations. Certified Research Associates conduct 
the research. Certification requires an advanced degree, gener-
ally a Ph.D., a record of academic publications, and professional 
references. Research projects culminate in a peer-reviewed 
publication, available both in hardcopy and on TransWeb, the 
MTI website (http://transweb.sjsu.edu). 
Education  
The educational goal of the Institute is to provide graduate-level 
education to students seeking a career in the development and 
operation of surface transportation programs. MTI, through San 
José State University, offers an AACSB-accredited Master of Sci-
ence in Transportation Management and a graduate Certificate 
in Transportation Management that serve to prepare the nation’s 
transportation managers for the 21st century. The master’s de-
gree is the highest conferred by the California State University 
system. With the active assistance of the California Department 
of Transportation, MTI delivers its classes over a state-of-
the-art videoconference network throughout the state 
of California and via webcasting beyond, allowing working 
transportation professionals to pursue an advanced degree 
regardless of their location. To meet the needs of employ-
ers seeking a diverse workforce, MTI’s education program 
promotes enrollment to under-represented groups. 
Information and Technology Transfer 
MTI promotes the availability of completed research to 
professional organizations and journals and works to 
integrate the research findings into the graduate education 
program. In addition to publishing the studies, the Institute 
also sponsors symposia to disseminate research results to 
transportation professionals and encourages Research As-
sociates to present their findings at conferences. The World 
in Motion, MTI’s quarterly newsletter, covers innovation 
in the Institute’s research and education programs. MTI’s 
extensive collection of transportation-related publications 
is integrated into San José State University’s world-class 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Library. 
The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for the facts and accuracy of the information presented here-
in. This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation, University Transportation Centers Program 
and the California Department of Transportation, in the interest of information exchange. This report does not necessarily reflect the official 
views or policies of the U.S. government, State of California, or the Mineta Transportation Institute, who assume no liability for the contents or 
use thereof. This report does not constitute a standard specification, design standard, or regulation.
DISCLAIMER
MTI FOUNDER 
Hon. Norman Y. Mineta
MTI BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Barron, Thomas E. (TE 2012)
President
Parsons Transportation Group
Barron de Angoiti, Ignacio  
(Ex-Officio)
Director Passenger and High Speed 
Department
International Union of Railways 
(UIC)
Boardman, Joseph (Ex-Officio)
Chief Executive Officer
Amtrak
Camph, Donald H. (TE 2011)
President
California Institute for Technology 
Exchange
Canby, Anne P. (TE 2010)
President
Surface Transportation Policy Project
Chmielinski, Jane (TE 2012)
President
AECOM
Executive Director 
Diridon, Rod* (Ex-Officio)
Mineta Transportation Institute
Dorey, William (TE 2011)
President/CEO
Granite Construction Inc.
Chair, Downey, Mortimer  
(TE 2012)
Senior Advisor
PB Consult Inc.
Fernandez, Nuria I. (TE 2012)
Senior Vice President
Major Programs Group CHRMHill
Guilbault, Rose (TE 2011)
Vice President 
American Automobile Association
Hamberger, Ed (Ex-Officio)
President/CEO
Association of American Railroads
Vice Chair, Heminger, Steve 
(TE 2012)
Executive Director
Metropolitan Transportation 
Commission
Horsley, John (Ex-Officio)*
Executive Director  
American Association of State 
Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO)
Kempton, Will (TE 2011)
CEO
Orange County Transportation 
Authority
McKim, Cindy (Ex-Officio)
Acting Director
California Department of 
Transportation
Millar, William* (Ex-Officio)
President
American Public Transportation 
Association (APTA)
Honorary Chairman
Mica, John L. (Ex-Officio)
Chair
House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee
House of Representatives
Mineta, Norman Y. (Ex-Officio)
Vice Chairman
Hill & Knowlton
Secretary of Transportation (ret.)
Pinson, Stephanie L. (TE 2012)
President/COO
Gilbert Tweed Associates, Inc.
Washington, DC
Honorary Co-Chair 
Rahall, Nick (Ex-Officio)
Vice Chairman
House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee
House of Representatives
Steele, David (Ex-Officio)
Dean, College of Business
San José State University
Toliver, Paul* (TE 2012)
President
New Age Industries
Townes, Michael S. (TE 2010)
President/CEO (ret.)
Transportation District Commision of 
Hampton Roads
Turney, David L.* (TE 2011)
Chairman, President & CEO
Digital Recorders, Inc.
Wytkind, Edward (Ex-Officio)
President 
Transportation Trades Department,
AFL-CIO
Hon. Rod Diridon, Sr.
Executive Director
Karen E. Philbrick, Ph.D.
Research Director
Peter Haas, Ph.D.
Education Director
Donna Maurillo
Communications Director 
 
Brian Michael Jenkins
National Transportation Security Center  
 
Asha Weinstein Agrawal, Ph.D.
National Transportation Finance Center
Asha Weinstein Agrawal, Ph.D.
Urban and Regional Planning 
San José State University
Jan Botha, Ph.D.
Civil & Environmental Engineering
San José State University
 
Katherine Kao Cushing, Ph.D.
Enviromental Science 
San José State University 
 
Dave Czerwinski, Ph.D.
Marketing and Decision Science 
San José State University
Frances Edwards, Ph.D.
Political Science 
San José State University
 
Taeho Park, Ph.D.
Organization and Management 
San José State University
Diana Wu
Martin Luther King, Jr. Library
San José State University
Directors Research Associates Policy Oversight Committee
**     Honorary
*   Chair
^    Vice Chair
#    Past Chair
The Intersection of Urban Form 
and Mileage Fees: Findings from the 
Oregon Road User Fee Pilot  
Program
MTI Report 10-04
Funded by U.S. Department of 
Transportation and California 
Department of Transportation
M
T
I
T
he Intersection of U
rban Form
 and M
ileage Fees
M
T
I Report 10-04
M
arch 2011
